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An ongoing dispute among district courts as to the scope of inter
partes review estoppel1 provides a useful set for later examination of game
theory perspectives on repeat players and institutional actors within the patent ecosystem: the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, District Courts, Petitioners, and Plaintiffs. While the Federal Circuit would normally be expected to rapidly address this ongoing rift, the potential alteration of the
issue by the Supreme Court through SAS Inst., Inc. v. Matal may give the
Circuit pause and provide a greater window for future study.2

Senior Lecturer, Monash Business School, Monash University; Empirical IP Fellow, Chicago-Kent
College of Law. The author would like to thank Professors Edward Lee and Professor Greg Reilly for
their support.
1. For a quick primer on this issue, see Jonathan R. Bowser, IPR Estoppel: District Courts Are
Questioning the Reasoning of Shaw but are Compelled to Follow It, 29 NO. 10 INTELL. PROP. & TECH.
L.J. 20 (2017).
2. 825 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2160 (May 22, 2017) (No. 16-969)
(argued Nov. 27, 2017).
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The America Invents Act of 20113 provides for patent challenges at
the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB or the “Board”) through a procedure known as inter partes review (IPR).4 A patent challenger files a petition noting the grounds upon which specific claims of a patent may be invalid. The PTAB, in reviewing the petition(s), may elect to institute review
only on claims that establish a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability and
may cull redundant or otherwise weak grounds.5 The PTAB then considers
and renders written judgment only as to those instituted claims in light of
those grounds.6
As a parallel track that may simplify litigation, parties in district court
patent actions may seek a stay pending IPR.7 However, much of the simplification inherent in IPR relies on the estoppel effect of IPR.8 If petitionerdefendants are able to utilize known prior art and combinations in both IPR
and patent actions, the winnowing of issues will be greatly limited.9 Accordingly, the estoppel provision of the act, 35 U.S.C. Section 315(e)(2),
provides that a patent challenger in U.S. District Court or the ITC that also
seeks IPR “may not assert” any invalidity ground in the patent case that it
“raised or reasonably could have raised during that inter partes review.”10

3. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35
U.S.C.).
4. 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–19 (2012).
5. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108 (2018); see also Jason German & Wayne Stacy, Prepare for More Estoppel if the Supreme Court Reverses Federal Circuit on Partial IPR Institutions, IP WATCHDOG (Jun. 25,
2017) http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/06/25/prepare-more-estoppel-supreme-court-reverses-federalcircuit-partial-institutions/id=84826/ (finding the PTAB partially instituted 50% of the time in 2013 and
23% of the time in 2016).
6. This is the very issue of SAS Inst., Inc. v. Matal. See 825 F.3d 1341, cert. granted, 137 S. Ct.
2160 (May 22, 2017) (No. 16-969) (concerning the validity of this practice in light of Section 318(a)).
7. Numerous academics have addressed the interesting strategic avenues introduced by this parallel system. See Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Arti K. Rai & Jay P. Kesan, Strategic Decision Making in Dual Ptab and District Court Proceedings, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45, 45 (2016); see also Jonathan
Stroud, Linda Thayer & Jeffrey C. Totten, Stay Awhile: The Evolving Law of District Court Stays in
Light of Inter Partes Review, Post-Grant Review, and Covered Business Method Post-Grant Review, 11
BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 226, 227 (2015); W. Michael Schuster, Invalidity Assertion Entities and Inter
Partes Review: Rent Seeking as a Tool to Discourage Patent Trolls, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1163
(2016).
8. See Shaw Indus. Grp. v. Automated Creel Sys., 817 F.3d 1293, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The
loss of this efficiency is a constant complaint of district courts struggling with Shaw.
9. See, e.g., Cobalt Boats, LLC v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., No. 2:15CV21, 2017 WL 2605977, at *3
(E.D. Va. June 5, 2017) (“It would waste this Court’s time to allow a stay for a year during IPR proceedings and then review invalidity arguments that Defendants could (and perhaps should) have raised
in their IPR petition.”).
10. “The petitioner in an inter partes review . . . that results in a final written decision . . . may not
assert either in a civil action [in district court] or in [an ITC investigation] that the claim is invalid on
any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during that inter partes review.” 35
U.S.C. § 315(e)(1).
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The prior understanding of that provision was that estoppel attached
broadly, giving the petitioning party incentive to focus on the best invalidity grounds while also providing a reasonably wide canvas of other invalidating grounds and art, all within the petitions’ constrained pages.11 However, the Federal Circuit disturbed this understanding by announcing a far
narrower reach of estoppel, first in Shaw Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Automated
Creel Sys., Inc.,12 and again in HP Inc. v. MPHJ Tech. Invs., LLC.13
In the former case, the Petitioner had petitioned for IPR bringing three
grounds against interposing claims.14 The Board instituted only on two of
those three grounds, denying institution of the third ground “as redundant
in light of [its] determination that there is a reasonable likelihood that the
challenged claims are unpatentable based on the grounds of unpatentability
on which we institute an inter partes review.”15 Petitioner later sought review of the ground that was not instituted as redundant. The Petitioner
sought a writ of mandamus “instructing the PTO to reevaluate its redundancy decision and to institute IPR based on the [non-instituted] ground,”
arguing that extraordinary relief was necessary as it would be estopped
from bringing that non-instituted ground in district court.16
The Court denied the writ. In short, the Federal Circuit read the “during that inter partes review” section text as applying only to instituted
grounds, on the basis that the IPR only occurs when review is actually instituted.17 Thus, petitioner’s petitioned but not instituted ground, which was
rejected without a merits review, was never part of the IPR and accordingly
was not estopped.18
Before exploring the potential meaning of Shaw, it is helpful to review
four categories of challenges that will come into play.

11. See, e.g., Clearlamp, LLC v. LKQ Corp., No. 12 C 2533, 2016 WL 4734389, at *8 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 18, 2016), judgment entered, 2016 WL 7013478 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2016); Note, Recasting the
U.S. International Trade Commission’s Role in the Patent System, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2337, 2342
(2013) (presenting broad estoppel as non-controversial point).
12. 817 F.3d at 1293.
13. 817 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“the noninstituted grounds do not become a part of the
IPR. Accordingly, the noninstituted grounds were not raised and, as review was denied, could not be
raised in the IPR.”); see also Shaw, 817 F.3d at 1299 (MPHJ’s citation of Shaw guards against accusations that the estoppel discussion in Shaw was mere dicta, as the court found it “lack[ed] jurisdiction to
review the Board’s decision not to institute IPR on the [redundant] ground.”).
14. Shaw, 817 F.3d at 1296.
15. Id. at 1297 (internal citations omitted, internal quotations omitted, and emphasis in original).
16. Id. at 1299.
17. Id. at 1300 (emphasis in original).
18. Id.
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1) Instituted Ground – a prior art ground advanced by petitioner
on which the PTAB institutes review of a claim;
2) Non-Petitioned Ground –a prior art ground not advanced by
petitioner;19
3) Non-Instituted Non-Procedural – a prior art ground advanced
by petitioner on which the PTAB does not institute review due
to merits or discretion; and
4) Non-Instituted Procedural – a prior art ground advanced by
petitioner on which the PTAB does not institute review due a
procedural reason, such as redundancy in light of other instituted grounds.
The exact meaning of Shaw has befuddled the district courts, as the
meaning of “reasonably could have raised” is hard to square with the literal
reading of Shaw. The difficulty of applying Shaw is further complicated by
two obstacles: first, the Federal Circuit did not have cause to address nonpetitioned grounds, and second, a narrowing of estoppel would potentially
give patent challengers two bites at the apple, thereby weakening the purposeful streamlining implicit in the very creation of the IPR process.
In light of the Federal Circuit’s arguable silence on this issue and the
particular salience of an issue impacting district court dockets, lower courts
have been exploring the contours of Shaw. The district courts have split into three camps with regard to the estoppel exemption:
1) Broad Shaw: Estoppel applies only to instituted grounds.
Thus, petitioners are not estopped for grounds that were petitioned but denied, as well as for grounds that were not petitioned, even if those grounds were known or capable of being
found with a diligent search.
2) Narrow Shaw: Shaw’s estoppel exemption applies only to petitioned but rejected grounds. Thus, the petitioners are estopped for grounds that were instituted, as well as for nonpetitioned grounds that could have been raised had the petitioner been reasonably diligent.
3) Extremely Narrow Shaw: Shaw’s estoppel exemption applies
only to the unique facts of Shaw. That is, the exemption ap19. For the purposes of this Article, assume that non-petitioned grounds involve art that a “skilled
searcher conducting a diligent search reasonably could have been expected to discover.” 157 CONG.
REC. S1375 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
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plies only to petitioned grounds that were rejected for procedural reasons, e.g., redundancy.
The chart below summarizes the reach of estoppel as to grounds in the
view of the relevant judicial camps:
Instituted
Grounds

Broad
Shaw
Narrow
Shaw
Extremely
Narrow
Shaw

I.

NonPetitioned
Grounds
Reasonably
Known

Petitioned
Grounds,
Not Instituted
for
nonProcedural
Reason

Petitioned
Grounds,
Not Instituted
for
Procedural
Reason

Estopped
Estopped

Estopped

Estopped

Estopped

Estopped

NOTABLE CASES IN THE RESPECTIVE CAMPS

To better understand the logic and posture of these respective camps,
it is helpful to review notable cases within each.
A. Broad Application of Shaw
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Toshiba Corp is notable in that Judge
Robinson applies Shaw broadly while simultaneously lambasting the logic
underpinning the Federal Circuit’s opinion.20 Judge Robinson wrote, “Although extending [this] logic to prior art references that were never presented to the PTAB at all (despite their public nature) confounds the very purpose of this parallel administrative proceeding, the court cannot divine a
reasoned way around the Federal Circuit’s interpretation in Shaw.”21 Judge

20.
21.

221 F. Supp. 3d 534, 553–54 (D. Del. 2016) (citing Shaw, 817 F.3d 1293).
Id. (emphasis added).

416

CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

Vol 17:2

Robinson’s opinion in denying reconsideration again signaled that the issue
needed to be addressed by the Federal Circuit on appeal.22
Koninklijke Philips N.V. And Philips Lighting North America Corp., v.
Wangs Alliance Corp.23 is an important case as it runs counter to the apparent shift typified by Oil Dri24 towards a restrictive reading of Shaw. While
the court notes that there is “much appeal in a broader reading of the estoppel provision,” it held that estoppel did not apply to non-petitioned claims
because “Shaw held that . . . ‘during inter partes review’ applies only to the
period of time after the PTAB has instituted review.”25
B. Narrow Application of Shaw
Douglass Dynamics v. Myer Prods. announced common themes of
district courts that are compelled to follow Shaw but seek to limit its impact.26 Namely, that the lack of estoppel will prevent a stay from simplifying issues in surviving civil litigation and undermines the legislative intent
of the law. Accordingly, the court applied Shaw to petitioned, noninstituted grounds, but found that known, non-petitioned grounds were estopped. “Shaw’s narrow view of § 315(e) estoppel undermines the purported efficiency of IPR, [and that u]nder this approach, IPR is not an alternative to litigating validity in the district court, it is an additional step in the
process.”27
Oil Dri Corp. v. Nestle Purina Petcare Co. is a vital “narrow Shaw”
case, that forcefully sets out the reasoning for applying Shaw’s estoppel exemption to petitioned, non-instituted grounds.28 Specifically, applying estoppel to “noninstituted (but petitioned-for) grounds—which the PTAB declines to fully consider—deprives a party of ‘a full and fair opportunity to
be heard on the estopped ground’” whereas “[estopping] a party [who]

22. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Toshiba Corp., Civ. No. 13-453-SLR, 2017 WL 107980, at *2
(D. Del. Jan. 11, 2017).
23. CA No. 14-12298-DJC, 2018 WL 283893 (D. Mass. Jan. 2, 2018).
24. Oil Dri Corp. v. Nestle Purina Petcare Co., No. 1-15-CV-01067, 2017 WL 3278915 (N.D. Ill.,
Aug. 2, 2017).
25. Koninklijke Philips, 2018 WL 283893, at *4.
26. No. 14-CV-886-JDP, 2017 WL 1382556 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 18, 2017).
27. Id. at *4; see also Cobalt Boats, LLC v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., No. 2:15CV21, 2017 WL
2605977, at *3 (E.D. Va. June 5, 2017) (“It would waste this Court’s time to allow a stay for a year during IPR proceedings and then review invalidity arguments that Defendants could (and perhaps should)
have raised in their IPR petition.").
28. 2017 WL 3278915, at *9.
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fails to raise a claim that it reasonably could have raised . . . is . . . fair—as
the party could only blame itself.”29
C. Very Narrow Application of Shaw
Biscotti Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. represents a clear outlier, with the
court doing all in its power to cabin the effects of Shaw.30
The Court recommends adopting the narrow view of Shaw
and HP . . . . Namely, the Court reads Shaw and HP to exempt an IPR petitioner from § 315(e)’s estoppel provision
only if the PTAB precludes the petitioner from raising a
ground during the IPR proceeding for purely procedural
reasons, such as redundancy . . . . Section 315(e) estops
[defendant] from asserting at trial: (1) grounds for which
the PTAB instituted IPR and determined those grounds to
be insufficient to establish unpatentability after a trial on
the merits; (2) grounds included in a petition but determined by the PTAB to not establish a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability (in other words, administrative review on the merits of a ground); and (3) grounds not
included in a petition that a ‘skilled searcher conducting a
diligent search reasonably could have been expected to
discover.’ . . . [Defendant] is not estopped from asserting
grounds included in a petition but which the PTAB found
redundant or declined to institute review for another procedural reason.31
II.

THE TRENDS OF THE DISTRICT COURTS AND THE SILENT
FEDERAL CIRCUIT

A review of case law shows a trend toward the narrow Shaw approach,32 unsurprising in light of the perceived inefficiencies of the broad
29. Id.
30. No. 2:13-CV-01015-JRG-RSP, 2017 WL 2526231, at *7 (E.D. Tex. May 11, 2017).
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Oil-Dri Corp. of Am. v. Nestle Purina Petcare Co., No. 15-CV-1067, 2017 WL
3278915, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 2017); Cobalt Boats, 2017 WL 2605977, at *3; Douglas Dynamics,
LLC v. Meyer Prod. LLC, No. 14-CV-886-JDP, 2017 WL 1382556, at *4 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 18, 2017),
reh’g granted in part, No. 14-CV-886-JDP, 2017 WL 2116714 (W.D. Wis. May 15, 2017); Parallel
Networks Licensing, LLC v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., CA No.13-2072 (KAJ), 2017 WL 1045912, at
*11 (D. Del. Feb. 22, 2017); Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp. v. Snap-On Inc., No. 14-CV-1296-JPS, 2017
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Shaw camp. However, the recent Koninklijke decision signals potential ongoing judicial constraint motivating at least some courts to buck this
trend.33 Courts that do adopt a broad Shaw reading appear to do so grudgingly, as both Koninklijke and Intellectual Ventures note the appeal of a
narrow Shaw reading before following the interpreted will of the Federal
Circuit. There appears to be at least one intra-district split, with the District
of Delaware adopting both the narrow Shaw approach in Parallel Networks
Licensing, LLC v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp.,34 and the broad Shaw approach
in Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Toshiba Corp.35
The Federal Circuit is not stepping in to address this rift. It has rejected as least one mandamus,36 and does not appear to be in any hurry to
weigh in. This may be due in part to the potential effects of SAS, which
may alter the practice of partial institutions. In SAS, the Federal Respondent
framed the issues thusly:
Section 318(a) of the Patent Act provides that, if the Patent
and Trademark Office (PTO) institutes an inter partes review, the agency’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board “shall issue a final written decision with respect to the patentability
of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner and any
new claim added” during the proceeding. 35 U.S.C. 318(a).
The question presented is as follows: Whether, in a case in
which the PTO agrees to review the patentability of only a
subset of the claims in a patent, the Board may address in
its final written decision only the patentability of those
claims the agency agreed to review.37

WL 4220457, at *25 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 22, 2017); Network-1 Techs., Inc. v. Alcatel-Lucent USA, Inc.,
No. 6:11-CV-492-RWS-KNM, 2017 WL 4478236, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2017).
33. See Verinata Health, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., No. 12-CV-05501-SI, 2017 WL 235048,
at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2017). For a greater discussion of constraint and judicial splits, see Brian
Sheppard & Andrew Moshirnia, For the Sake of Argument: A Behavioral Analysis of Whether and How
Legal Argument Matters in Decisionmaking, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 537, 555 (2013).
34. No. CV 13-2072 (KAJ), 2017 WL 1045912, at *11 (D. Del. Feb. 22, 2017) (noting litigant
was estopped from bringing claims based on prior art combinations of which it was aware before it filed
its IPR petitions, though the court does not mention Shaw).
35. 221 F. Supp. 3d 534, 554 (D. Del. 2016).
36. See In re Verinata Health, Inc., No. 2017-109, 2017 WL 1422489, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 9,
2017).
37. Brief for the Federal Respondent in Opposition, at I, SAS Inst., Inc. v. Matal, 137 S. Ct. 2160
(2017) (No. 16-969), 2017 WL 1291696, at *I.
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SAS concerns the ability of the PTAB to address only particular
claims. However, if the Board may no longer issue piecemeal decisions as
to claims, it may reasonably impact the Board’s approach to piecemeal
handling of grounds.
III.

WHEN RULES CHANGE, GAMING FOLLOWS

The differences between the Pre- and Post-Shaw approaches, and between the Post-Shaw approaches themselves, provide a wealth of potential
trends to test for.
Specifically, the values of various grounds that are not instituted are
no longer uniform:
1) Petitioned, but Not Instituted Grounds are More Valuable
Post-Shaw—The Post-Shaw approach shared by the broad and
narrow camp is the treatment of petitioned, non-instituted
grounds as exempt from estoppel.
2) The Narrow Application of Shaw Restricts Petitioners—The
narrow application of Shaw may force petitioners to abandon
any ground that reasonably could have been included in the
IPR petition. The extreme narrow application of Shaw further
limits petitioners.
3) Grounds Rejected for Procedural Reasons are Superior to
Grounds Rejected on Abbreviated Merits—The extremely
narrow application of Shaw elevates procedural rejections of
petition grounds, e.g., for redundancy, than those that fail to
present a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability.
The disparate value of non-instituted grounds and the potential uncertainty with regard to estoppel effect will invite gaming by the relevant actors. The following hypothetical trends should be examined.
A. Greater Forum Shopping by Plaintiffs
With district courts taking very different views of estoppel, plaintiffs
may seek to file suit in districts that apply a narrow interpretation of Shaw
in an attempt to restrict defendant petitioners. Such a move may be difficult
to detect, as estoppel considerations are not the only factors driving the
rampant forum shopping in patent litigation. It is worth noting that the
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Eastern District of Texas, the poster child for forum shopping and judge
shopping38 in matters of patent litigation, has seemingly embraced a narrow
view of Shaw.39 More importantly, the Supreme Court constrained the ability to forum shop in TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC,
further muddying the ability to detect a clear forum bias.40
B. More Grounds Brought by Petitioners Spread Across More
Petitions
As it is unclear whether non-petitioned grounds will be subject to estoppel, petitioners have much greater incentive to bring all available
grounds across multiple petitions. Petitioners would also likely bring redundant grounds, as a non-institution on redundant grounds would be most
immune from estoppel. As estoppel does not attach on non-instituted
claims, petitioners could file multiple petitions, with each populated by
claims of relatively the same strength.41 It would be worth exploring if the
number of petitions per patent increases, while noting the number of claims
per patent within those multiple petition challenges. Should this gaming
become obvious, the Board may respond by denying multiple petitions
based on duplicative art.42

38. Jonas Anderson, Judge Shopping in the Eastern District of Texas, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 539,
544 (2016) (explaining how judge shopping occurs in the Eastern District of Texas).
39. See Biscotti Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 2:13-CV-01015-JRG-RSP, 2017 WL 2526231, at *7
(E.D. Tex. May 11, 2017); see also Infernal Tech., LLC v. Elec. Arts Inc., No. 2:15-CV-01523-JRGRSP, 2016 WL 9000458, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2016) (discussing lack of simplification inherent to
a broad Shaw approach); Network-1 Techs. Inc. v. Alcatel-Lucent USA, Inc., No. 6:11-CV-492-RWSKNM, 2017 WL 4478236, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2017).
40. 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1520 (2017). Commentators differ as to the efficacy of this effort. Bryan A
Kohm & Jonathan T. McMichael, Forum Shopping Tactics After TC Heartland, LEXOLOGY.COM (July
27, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=d318fbd1-16e8-416b-9eeb-181c82ba720a;
see also Josh Landau, TC Heartland Attacks The Heart Of Patent Forum Shopping, PAT. PROGRESS
(May 23, 2017), https://www.patentprogress.org/2017/05/23/tc-heartland-attacks-heart-of-patent-forumshopping/; Tom McParland, So Much for ‘TC Heartland’ Effect. One Apple Store Enough for Venue,
Judge Says, LAW.COM (Aug. 14, 2017) https://www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2017/08/10/judge-singleapple-store-makes-delaware-venue-proper-for-patent-litigation-against-techgiant/?slreturn=20180017135716. A common concern is that TC Heartland is merely overloading the
District of Delaware. Lauren H. Cohen, Umit G. Gurun & Scott Duke Kominers, Patent Trolling Isn’t
Dead—It’s Just Moving to Delaware, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 28, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/06/patenttrolling-isnt-dead-its-just-moving-to-delaware.
41. Jason German & Wayne Stacy, Prepare for More Estoppel if the Supreme Court Reverses
Federal Circuit on Partial IPR Institutions, IP WATCHDOG (June 25, 2017),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/06/25/prepare-more-estoppel-supreme-court-reverses-federal-circuitpartial-institutions/id=84826/.
42. See id.
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C. District Courts Requiring Judicial Estoppel For Stays
District courts may seek to limit the impact of Shaw by requesting that
parties stipulate to be estopped in line with Pre-Shaw or very Narrow Shaw
approaches. This appears to have been the case in Infernal Tech., LLC v.
Elec. Arts Inc.43 There, the court noted, “the question of issue simplification in a case emerging from IPR with claims withstanding challenge depends on whether the Court will be required to assess the uncertain scope
of IPR estoppel, and whether the parties will be required to relitigate invalidity issues already litigated at the PTAB.”44 Accordingly, the only way
that, “the Court can ensure that the issues would truly be simplified under
the current state of the law” was if
[defendant] stipulates that for any claims surviving IPR,
[defendant] will not assert a defense under §§ 102 or 103
based on prior art that it raised or reasonably could have
raised in its IPR petitions, including any applicable references cited in [defendant]’s invalidity contentions or relied
upon by [defendant]’s expert witness in his opening expert
report regarding invalidity.45
CONCLUSION
The Shaw rift will eventually need to be addressed, either directly by
the Federal Circuit or obliquely by the Supreme Court. As IPR estoppel is
an issue with high salience to repeat players, one would expect dynamic
strategies to result. Empirical study of filings can test for these hypothetical
patterns and provide opportunities for additional insight into actors in the
patent ecosystem.

43. No. 2:15-CV01523-JRG-RSP, 2016 WL 9000458, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2016); see also
Lighting Sci. Grp. Corp. v. Shenzhen Jiawei Photovoltaic Lighting Co., No. 16-CV-03886-BLF, 2017
WL 2633131, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 2017).
44. Infernal, 2016 WL 9000458, at *4.
45. Id. at *5.

